The analytic and institutional space of transdisciplinary gender studies by Gremillion, Helen
The Analytic and Institutional Space 
of Transdisciplinary Gender Studies
Helen Gremillion
Unitec Institute of Technology
Presented 23/05/13
5th Christina Conference on Gender Studies
University of Helsinki, Finland
The Analytic Space of Gender Studies
• A narrower focus! Gender Studies as a field name: some 
implications for, and debates surrounding, the content and 
viability of this area of study.
• From 1998-2008 I was the first tenure-track, and tenured, 
faculty member in the Department of Gender Studies at 
Indiana University.  The Department had not long been 
christened “Gender Studies”: hotly debated at the time.
• No longer the case: In 2012, Robyn Wiegman refers to the 
“standing ovation” the term gender has recently received “as 
the critical means to rejuvenate the optimism once signified 
by women in the field inaugurated in that name” (p. 10).
• It is by now a widely-accepted argument that “women” is an 
unstable, fractured, and contested category of identity -- one 
that is inextricably bound up with questions of race, class, 
sexuality, and nationality.
• So what about the term  “gender”? Wiegman (2012, 2002) 
and others (Hemmings, 2005; Lee, 2002) warn against a 
familiar “progress” narrative in the field positing “gender” as a 
category of identity that will transcend the limitations of 
“women.”
• There are two core arguments against this progress narrative:  
• 1) “Gender” is not more coherent than “women”: it too fails 
fully to “capture” or explicate the identities it purports to 
represent (and this is an expanded list: e.g. women, men, 
LGBTQ identities) (see especially Weigman 2012, 2002; Brown 
1997); and
• 2) The reading of poststructuralist theories that has given us 
“gender” as a superseding category is problematic: it 
simplifies 1970s and 1980s women’s studies scholarship as 
fixed and narrow -- as uniformly naïve and essentialist in its 
focus on women and on sexual difference, in contrast to 
scholarship about socially constructed, mutable, and 
capacious gender (Hemmings, 2005; Weigman 2012, 2002).
• This critique of a progress narrative from women to gender is 
compelling and important in a number of ways
• Particularly compelling is Weigman’s argument against realist 
referentiality altogether in our naming practices for the field. 
Citing the recognized inadequacy of the category “women” as 
a key theoretical achievement for women’s studies, Weigman 
(2002) argues not so much for or against name changes, but 
rather in favour of resignifying the “women” in women’s 
studies to allow for “a rigorous pursuit of [its] incoherence as 
a problematic that animates the field” (p. 140).
• However, I believe a strong case can be made for the field 
name “Gender Studies,” if the choice is between Gender 
Studies and Women’s Studies (“Feminist Studies”:institutional
politics that are beyond the scope of this short presentation).
• I argue that the progress narrative is problematic not only 
because of its failed attempts fully to represent or “capture” 
gendered identities, but also because of its relatively narrow 
focus on a particular, post-structuralist version of identity 
construction.  Weigman challenges the presumed coherence 
of gender identity representations or rubrics, offering the 
important argument that any identity category will always be 
incommensurate with its socio-political expression (Weigman 
2012).  I agree with Weigman, and, I would like to challenge 
narratives of identity “construction” within the field from a 
different angle. 
• It is a mistake, I believe, to construe the field’s objects of 
study as, primarily, identities (gender is said to signal a more 
expansive and inclusive list); and, it is a mistake to assume 
that post-structuralist theory is, necessarily, primarily about 
identities and their mutability (gender thought to be is a 
flexible framework for identity construction, as opposed to 
women, which is a fixed and essentialist identity category).
• Instead, I argue for “Gender Studies” as a field name because 
it marks an analytic space that signals attention to  1) the 
production of a range of gendered identities, and  2) 
formations and dimensions of social life that are gender-
coded.  Understood thus, gender is not an identity category: it 
is, rather, a fractured and diverse social formation.  Nor is 
gender incoherent: it is powerfully structured (if not given or 
fixed).
• The remainder of this talk will explore what I think are 
problematic tendencies in the field to view both gender and 
post-structuralist theory in terms of identity construction 
(that is, a particular, and I think narrow, conception of identity 
construction).
• I do so through a critical analysis of a frequently cited and 
provocative article by Wendy Brown (1997), “The 
Impossibility of Women’s Studies.”
• I then close with a (very) brief consideration of Gayle 
Salamon’s (2010) ideas re., what it would take for the field to 
engage more fully with transgender studies.  Interestingly, 
Salamon uses Brown as a springboard to scope what might be 
possible – not impossible – for the field, and she offers a 
reformulated set of ideas about identity construction. 
• Brown (1997) argues that Women’s Studies is not intelligible 
as a field because “women” and “gender” never stand alone 
in social life: they are always entailed in complex and varied 
processes of subject formation involving the equally non-
discrete categories of “race, class, nation, and so forth” (p. 
93). 
• For Brown, identity categories cannot simply be “intersected” 
because they are not separable from each other or from the 
forms of power that produce subjectivities.  Nor is the 
problem solved by specifying subjectivities in greater detail, 
“e.g. mapping the precise formation of the contemporary 
‘middle-class Tejana lesbian’” (pp. 93-4).
• The proliferation of highly specific categories of identity veers 
towards positivism and simplistic models of social power, 
even as it excludes persons who will “feel misdescribed by 
such descriptions even as they officially ‘fit’ them” (p. 94).
• According to Brown, if gendered identities cannot be made to 
cohere as bounded “things” in social life, then neither 
“women” nor “gender” can stand as the foundation of a field 
of study.
• Brown notes that in the wake of post-structuralism, every field 
faces challenges in attempting to secure its boundaries and 
“fix” its object(s) of study.  But for Brown, insurmountable
problems of this sort appear in fields “organized by social 
identity rather than by genre of inquiry” (p. 86).
• Discourses of social identity (Brown’s “race, class, nation, and 
so forth”) are incommensurable, interweaving, and differently 
cross-cutting.  
• Therefore, Brown writes: “Women’s studies… may be 
politically and theoretically incoherent, as well as tacitly 
conservative – incoherent because by definition it 
circumscribes uncircumscribable ‘women’ as an object of 
study, and conservative because it must resist all objections to 
such circumscription if it is to sustain that object of study as 
its raison d'être” (p. 83).
• But the slippage throughout Brown’s article between 
“women” and “gender” is problematic for her argument, 
because gender is not a social identity in the same way that 
women is a social identity.  It is, rather, a category of analysis 
(as well as a powerful social formation).
• Brown’s argument loses conceptual clarity here, because her 
main objection to women’s/gender studies as a field results 
from its attempts to specify subjectivities.  
• The gender of “gender studies” – as well as the analytic 
category of gender within “women’s studies” – is not 
coterminous with gendered subjects (e.g., women and men).
• This point is in fact crucial for Brown’s argument: what she 
calls a model (e.g. gender studies) for grasping a particular 
modality of subject(ing) power (e.g. gendering) will not map 
onto the making of specific gendered subjects in social life, 
because gendered subjects are never “just about gender.”
• I agree with Brown that gender “on the ground,” in its specific 
expression via living subjects’ social identities, does not exist 
in any “pure” form.  Nor does it simply interdigitate in neat 
and predictable ways with other modalities of subject(ing) 
power in processes of subject formation.  
• But Brown slips into the additional claim that gender 
generally ceases to cohere – as a model, an analytic category, 
and the topic or the “object of study” within women’s/gender 
studies.
• I suggest that when one loses sight of gender as an analytic 
category that encompasses more than (but is integrally 
imbricated in) the identities of living subjects, one also loses 
sight of the real effects of social, economic, and ideological 
processes that are gendered and that provide an authorizing 
context for the solidification, as well as the reconfiguration, of 
gendered identities.
• Twenty-five years ago, Joan Scott (1988) articulated some of 
the core issues to consider here, in her analysis of gender “as 
a primary way of signifying relationships of power” (p. 42).  
She provides an example from nineteenth century France:
• “Attention to gender is often not explicit, but it is nonetheless 
a crucial part of the organization of equality or inequality.  
Hierarchical structures rely on generalized understandings of 
the so-called natural relationships between male and female.  
The concept of class in the nineteenth century relied on 
gender for its articulation.  While middle-class reformers in 
France, for example, depicted workers in terms coded as 
feminine (subordinated, weak, sexually exploited like 
prostitutes), labor and socialist leaders replied by insisting on 
the masculine position of the working class (producers, 
strong, protectors of their women and children).  The terms of 
this discourse were not explicitly about gender, but they were 
strengthened by references to it.  The gendered ‘coding’ of 
certain terms established and ‘naturalized’ their meanings.  In 
the process, historically specific, normative definitions of 
gender were reproduced and embedded in the culture of the 
French working class” (Scott, 1988, p. 48).
• So: gendered beliefs materialize into practices that embed 
these beliefs in them.  In other words, just because gender is 
a complex construction does not mean it lacks coherence; 
rather, gender achieves solidity (not fixity) in its ongoing, 
patterned production through multiple ideological and 
institutional supports.
• Scott’s understanding of gender as a constructed category is 
in keeping with the vast majority of scholarship that embraces 
post-structuralist theory.  Most constructionists accept the 
idea that categories of gender are real – in the crucially 
important sense that people are compelled to live out their 
lives in these very powerful, and socially unequal, terms.
• But a problem with many constructionist approaches to 
gendered identities – one that is not, however, inherent in 
post-structuralist theories – is a tendency to analyze identity 
construction as a semi-autonomous realm of social life. Post-
structuralist accounts of subjectivity sometimes do seem 
unmoored from specific material and historical conditions of 
identity production, which can leave an impression of free-
floating identities.
• This problem can be traced to the work of Michel Foucault.  
Quite some time ago, cultural studies theorist Stuart Hall 
(1985) argued that Foucault -- following Althusser, and in his 
quarrel with Marx’s materialist analysis of class consciousness 
-- rendered ideology coterminous with subject formation.
• This move allowed for a more complex, and welcome, analysis 
of subjectivity; but when ideology is fully equated with 
subject formation, the reproduction of what Marx called the 
relations of production is reduced to “the reproduction of 
labor power, whereas reproduction in Marx is a much wider 
concept, including the reproduction of the social relations of 
possession and exploitation…” (Hall, 1985, pp. 98-9).
• In a similar vein, Lynn Segal (2000) has pointed out that 
analyses of gender often focus on gender subjectivity and 
cultural imagery without interrogating the constitutive role of 
particular, material, and unequal social and economic 
relations in the production and reproduction of gender.
• So, in sum: post-structuralist accounts of gender can allow for 
the ideas that 1) gender is larger than identity, and 2) gender 
is substantively real (i.e., coherent, if not stable or uniform) –
and, gender is analyzable.
• In her account of trans bodies and subjectivities, Gayle 
Salamon (2010) provides just such a reading of gender, and 
further argues that this reading is necessary if the field of 
gender studies is to keep pace with non-normative genders.
• For Salamon, trans bodies and subjectivities are inextricably 
social and, at the same time, undeniably actual.  They are not 
self-evidently real or material, but they are indeed real and 
material, as they are felt and lived in the world as “a horizon 
of possibility” (p. 91).
• Salamon cites Brown’s quarrel with the field of 
women’s/gender studies; she aligns herself with Brown’s 
critique of an “additive” model of identities that would ossify 
subjectivity.
• But rather than argue for the field’s dissolution, Salamon 
wants to re-theorize gender in such a way that identities are 
understood as neither free-floating nor pre-given (Butler).
• Salamon calls for an account of “the vast cultural apparatus 
that authorizes gender” (p. 192), and an account of “gender 
nominalism, without lapsing into normativity” (p. 100).
• For Salamon, the specificities of trans identities point to the 
ways in which all identities are social, intersubjective, and 
lived achievements.  I suggest that these ideas about gender 
studies point the way towards work in the field that is robust, 
and that avoids narratives of progress for identity categories.
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